ࡱ>  @ 4bjbj)) 3KzKzcKh h h h  <<<8<th=L h=="===???Àŀŀŀŀŀŀ$R:Q D??DDh x ==4:HHHDv = R=ÀHDÀHHy "}== p's<E0{&ÀP0{Ȇ8FȆL}  h h Ȇ } ?r@HAhB*??? d%F* %PPPsLessons of Experience Introduction Debate about public-private partnerships (PPPs) is distorted by a lack of objectivity on the part of both those supporting PPPs and those opposing them. Analysis is certainly difficult, becauseas I will demonstratemeasurement of the benefits of a PPP programme is itself difficult. But a realistic approach is necessary if this debate is not to be just an exchange of propaganda. Let me begin by defining what I mean by a PPP, since public-private partnership is one of these expressions which can mean whatever the speaker wants it to mean. In my opinion, a PPP involves: Private-sector investment in public infrastructure plus: long-term service provision by the private sector plus: transfer of investment and operating risks from the public sector to the private sector with ultimate ownership normally retained by the public sectori.e. this is not privatisation. There are two main sub-types of PPPs: the concession model, i.e. a model where payment for use of the facility is made by end-users, such as a toll road; and the PFI model (because its modern development originates from the British PFIPrivate Finance Initiativeprogramme), i.e. a model where payment for use of the facility, or for provision of a service, is made by the public sector. These arrangements can be called partnerships, but this is really only a political slogan: they are not partnerships in the legal senses, but long-term contracts between the public and private sectors. So for the rest of this brief paper I want to concentrate on two issues: In the light of experience, how credible are the theoretical arguments for and against PPPs? and Why do PPP programmes sometimes fail to achieve the benefits that were expected? Arguments for and against PPPs (1) Balance-sheet treatment There can be little doubt that the main reason for the explosion of interest in PPPs around the world in recent years is based on them being off-balance sheet for the public sector, that is, investment in PPPs can be made despite constraints on public expenditure and debt, such as under the Maastricht Treaty. Other motives may exist for using PPPs, as I will discuss shortly, but they are secondary. (It is of course rather strange for artificial accounting treatment to affect how the public sector funds investments in infrastructure, but we have to live with that, at least for now.) Obviously the ability to accelerate investment in economic and social infrastructure can be beneficialit would be difficult to imagine, for example, that the huge investment in new schools and hospitals which has taken place in Britain over the last 10 years or so would have happened without the PFI programmethe money would just not have been found from the public-sector budget. However, in the PFI model the expenditure is only deferred and spread out over time, and so there is an eventual effect on the public-sector budgethence the recent difficulties in Portugal in paying for their PPP road programme. And similarly making people pay tolls could be considered as just another form of tax. It could therefore be said that PPPs allow the politicians to get the short-term credit from new investment in infrastructure, without being unduly constrained by long-term funding issuesbut if this means that essential infrastructure gets built when otherwise it would not have done, this may still not be a bad thing. (2) Cost comparison with public procurement The commonest argument against PPPs are that they are expensive, because the government can borrow money more cheaply to fund such projects. Of course it is true that government borrows at a lower cost, but this is not the full story. The governments cost of borrowing is lower because lenders to the government are not taking the same risk as lenders to a PPP project. But these risks do not go away if the government undertakes a projectthe same risks exist but their consequences are paid for separately by the taxpayer. So in comparing the cost of direct public-sector procurement against a PPP, one has to take account of the greater risk transfer to the private sector in the PPP case. Examples of such risk transfer include: the risks that construction of the project will not be completed on time or on budget, i.e. the risk of a capital-cost overrun; the risks that operation and maintenance of the project will cost more than budgeted over the project life, i.e. the risk of an operating-cost overrun; and the risk that usage of the project will be lower than expected. (This is transferred to the private sector in the concession model, but not the PFI model.) It would probably be generally accepted that public-sector procurement is subject to what is known as optimism bias, that is public-sector officials tend to underestimate these risks because they are not subject to the same disciplines as private-sector investors. It is therefore reasonable, when comparing a PPP with public-sector procurement (using what is known as a Public-Sector Comparator, or PSC), to increase the comparative costs of public-sector procurement to allow for risk transfer or optimism bias. However it is extremely difficult to work out the level of adjustments that should be made, since the data for this is very limited. Furthermore, basic assumptions such as the discount rate to be used for the comparison make an enormous difference to the results. Therefore PSCs which purport to prove that PPPs are cost-effective compared to public procurement are far too easily manipulated, and will seldom stand up to objective analysis. (It is interesting to note that PSCs now play a very limited rle in the British PFI programme, although other countries still put a lot of emphasis on them.) Little purpose is really served by making an artificial comparison between the cost of a publicly-procured project and a PPP, when in reality the choice is between a PPP and no project at allbecause there is no budget for a publicly-procured project. If the real choice is PPP or no project, the public sector should not waste too much time on PSC calculations, but concentrate on implementing the best possible PPP deal, a topic to which I will return a bit later. But of course it is difficult for governments to come out into the open and say they cannot prove that a PPP offers better value than public procurement, however unrealistic public procurement may be. (3) Cost Overruns Measuring the benefits of a PPP programme is also something which has to be done with care. For example, whenever the British PFI programme is discussed by anyone in the public sector, the argument is usually made that most PFI projects are completed on-time and on-budget, unlike projects procured by the public sector. This is probably true, but once more it is not the full story, for several reasons: Firstly. PPP projects are almost all built by construction sub-contractors who enter into turnkey contacts to do so, i.e. design and build contracts with penalties for failure to complete on time or to specification. This is why there are no cost overrunsthe design risk is transferred to the private sector, so there is no interface risk between design, construction and operation. Typically the costs of many public-sector procured projects overrun because of errors or defects in design, or changes in design by the public sector after the construction contract has been placed. But of course the public sector can also procure a project using a turnkey or design and build contract, and achieve the same result. It is for this reason that the U.S. Federal Highway Administration actually includes design and build contracts (but with no private-sector financing) within its definition of a PPP. Secondly, a turnkey contract has a substantial extra cost, which has to be taken into account. A recent European Investment Bank study comparing publicly-procured and PPP roads found that on average the ex-ante cost of a PPP road was 24% higher than a publicly-procured road. In my own experience this premium of around 20% is typical in most kinds of PPP. The main reason for the premium is that the construction sub-contractors have to price in the extra risks of a turnkey contract. On the other hand, the same EIB study mentions that the average ex-post cost overrun of publicly-procured roads is also around 24%, so the final result is much the same, despite public-sector cost overruns. Thirdly, although accelerated procurement in infrastructure through a PPP programme may produce economies of scale, it can also affect capacity in the construction industry, and so lead to project costs becoming higher than they would have been had the procurement been more spread out in time, so eliminating these economies of scale. Finally, and perhaps most important, it is commonplace for the cost of a PPP project to increase significantly (or for the scope of the project to be reduced, which comes to the same thing) between the time the project is first approved, and the time the contract is signed, an issue which I will discuss later. So cost overruns do occur, but at a different stage in the process. (4) New Public Management The main theoretical case for PPPs revolves around the concept of New Public Management (or NPM), which can be traced back to the successful privatisations of public utilities which took in the 1980s under Thatcher government in Britain, and which were subsequently copied in many other countries. NPM promotes: decentralisation of government; separating responsibility for the purchase of public services from that of their provision; output or performance-based measurements for public services; and contracting-out public services to the private sector. NPM theorists take the view that the private sector is more efficient than the state, and so the private sector should be used to provide public services within a framework set up by the state. The relevance of PPPs to this approach is clear, but while the theory behind NPM may be reasonable, measuring private-sector efficiency in an objective way so as to justify a PPP project or programme is again very difficult. (5) Output Specification Let us look, for example, at output or performance-based specifications. Apart from the NPM theory already mentioned, these are needed because otherwise performance risk would not transfer effectively to the private sector. But as projects get more complex, the public sectors output requirements have to be set out in more and more detail, and eventually the output specification goes round in a circle and becomes an input specification. So output specifications only work where the public sectors requirements are simple enough to be clearly specified in advance. (6) Whole Life Budgeting Another argument for PPP is that the private-sector consortium building the project has to bear in mind that they will also be operating it, and so should design it for the most efficient operation, instead of just building it cheaply and walking away. However there has been little objective work so far to measure how much significant change in construction design occurs with a PPP. Similarly a PPP requires the public sector to specify clearly what is wanted over the life of the project, and set aside a long-term budget for this purpose, instead of building something and then not maintaining it properly. This approach also makes the true lifetime cost of a project clear. Unfortunately such transparency may not always be politically beneficial: it leads to opponents of PPPs making statements likeOh this hospital only cost 100 million to build, but payments under the PPP contract come to 300 million , which of course ignores the cost which would be incurred in the public sector to operate and maintain the hospital over the life of the contract, and the public-sectors own cost of finance. Linked to this, one of the arguments against PPPs is that they commit the public-sector to long-term contracts, with no flexibility to make changes if circumstances changefor example closing s school down if the local population mix changes and the number of pupils declines. But if the public sector had constructed the school there would still be a problem with closing it down, since this would be a waste of the public funding which had been used for its constructionalthough it is true that there are extra financial costs in terminating a PPP. (7) Investment at Risk It could be said that many of the benefits of a PPP can be achieved without using private-sector finance. I have already mentioned that the public sector can itself enter into turnkey contracts to avoid construction-cost overruns; similarly the public sector can enter into long-term operation and maintenance contracts for infrastructure without requiring the private sector to built it. But in such cases private-sector investors and banks do not have money invested which they will lose if the project goes wrong. This investment at risk in the PPP structure provides a much greater incentive to ensure that problems are sorted out without relying on public-sector support. However this may not always happen, as I will discuss shortly. (8) Distortion of Choice Another of the arguments against PPPs is that they distort choice: the projects which are undertaken are those which can fit easily into the PPP model, rather than those which are the most economically or socially desirable. For example, school PFI projects in Britain have wherever possible involved the construction of new schools rather than the repair of old ones, to the extent that there have been public protests against beautiful old schools being demolished. This is because a construction sub-contractor will be reluctant to take on turnkey risk in repairing an old building, whose condition will be largely unknown. Similarly, the biggest PPP in Africa is the Gautrain project which links Johannesburg and its airport to Pretoria. This will have a capital cost of some $3.5 billion, with substantial public-sector subsidies, but primarily benefits the rich white suburbs of Johannesburg rather than the poor black areas such as Soweto, because this routing for the train line is the most financially viable. So viability as a PPP has overridden the social and economic benefits of other choices. (9) Removal of balance-sheet benefits Britain has recently taken the decision to change public-sector accounting for PFI-model projects from 2008, the effect of which will probably be that projects which are primarily about buildings (e.g. schools and hospitals) rather than services will end up on the public-sector balance sheet. The effect of this remains to be seen, but it seems likely that such building projects, which have formed the bedrock of the PFI programme, will either be taken out of the programme altogether, or will involve much lower levels of private finance. This probably confirms that the other arguments for PPPs which I have discussed are quite weak, since otherwise the change in balance-sheet status should make no difference to the PFI programme. Let me be clearI am not arguing a case against the use of PPPs for public procurement. I think there is a place for them, but governments should not be under an illusion that they are an easy way out of budgetary constraints, or that the theoretical or economic arguments for PPPs are simple or point in one direction. Failures of Implementation This leads me to the second half of this papereven assuming that the government is convinced that there is a good case for a PPP programme, it is all too easy for its benefits to be undermined by poor implementation. It is impossible for me to cover these issues fully in the time available, because inevitably such failures of implementation often involve matters of detail and technical complexity, but I can briefly set out some of the more obvious problems which arise. I will just pick out three areas for discussionprocurement, contracting, and politics. (1) Procurement It is lack of competition in the public-sector procurement process which is the source of greatest failure. A recent study by the U.K. National Audit Office found that the average procurement under the PFI programme took just under 3 years, half of which time was spent in negotiation with a single preferred bidder, and that  significant changes were made on S! of the projects during this period. Negotiation with a single bidder for 1 years will clearly erode the benefits of a PPP contract by changing costs, project scope and the balance of risk transfer a process known as  deal creep. I have myself spent far too much time sitting on the public-sector side of the table watching deal creep taking place. This problem is certainly not peculiar to the U.K.: let me give you an example, admittedly an extreme one, from one of your neighboursthe A2 motorway in Poland. The preferred bidder for that project was chosen in March 1997; the project did not reach financial close, i.e. all documentation was not finalised, until September 2001, 4 years later. Major changes in project scope and risk transfer took place, but there was no retendering for the project. This was clearly not beneficial to the public sector. As you will probably be aware the European Union has introduced a new procurement procedure, known as competitive dialogue, which is supposed to deal with this problemit remains to be seen if this will have much effect. Why does this happen? The answer is often very simplelack of adequate preparation by the public sector. In other words, the public sector goes out to the market for bids: without sufficient understanding of what is needed to make the project technically or financially viable for private-sector investors and lenders, e.g. relating to risk transfer; without specifying its requirements clearly, or in enough detail; or without adequate investigation of likely project costs, meaning that the bids are too expensive and the scope of the project has to be changed later on; any of which means that major changes have to take place during negotiations after bids are submitted. Apart from higher costs and inadequate risk transfer, a longer-term result of a poor procurement process may be what has been called privatising profits while socialising lossesin other words if the project goes seriously wrong it is the public sector which has to pick up the pieces, because it is necessary to maintain the public service which the PPP is providing. This should not happen if the private sector has capital at risk, as I said previously, but there can certainly come a point where it is cheaper for the private sector to walk away from the problem (or threaten to) than sort it out. This is a particular problem on concession-model PPPs, often linked to optimism bias on traffic projections. (2) Contractual Failure Another failure of implementation which may only become evident years after the contract is signed is caused by what I would call contractual failure. This can happen in many different waysfor example unanticipated problems with the long-term output specificationsbut my own experience deals especially with the financial aspects of PPP contracts. Almost every time I look at a PPP contract I find errors in financial clauses which, in some cases, could substantially erode the PPPs benefits. A concession or PPP law may sometimes provide a framework for dealing with such matters, but this alone is not usually adequate. Small and apparently innocuous provisions in the contract, such as discount or cash-flow calculations relating to contract changes or termination payments, can completely change the real risk transfer. And if the contract does not address such issues at all, errors later on in dealing with such issues are also highly likely. Similarly the use of financial derivatives such as interest-rate swaps may create hidden risks which the public sector does not properly understand, and thus take into account in its evaluation of bid proposals. (3) Political Failure Thirdly I would like to talk about what I would call political failure, which undermines support for a PPP programme. One of the biggest problem often faced by public-sector officials trying to put a PPP together is a politically-driven timetablethe political masters insist on the project progressing according to an artificial timetable (e.g. one fixed in relation to an election date). This pushes the project out into the market for bids before it is ready, with the procurement consequences which I have already discussed. Another form of political failure is simply the government not communicating the arguments for a PPP programme and its benefits in a clear enough way, or presenting misleading arguments which are easily knocked down, such as some of those I have already discussed. In my view the British government is remarkably bad at presenting the case for the PFI programme to the general public, so most of the publicity that PFI gets is bad publicity. For example, political opponents often argue that PPPs allow the private sector to profit from what should be public services. This is illogical: even if the public sector procures a new road or hospital, this will be built (and perhaps operated or maintained also) by a private-sector contractor who will of course make a profit from doing do. One alternative way of dealing with the private profit issue is to use not for profit PPP models, such as one I have recently been involved in developing in Scotland, but this is something which also has to be undertaken with great care, if the reduction in profit in one part of the contract is not to be eroded by increased profits being taken out elsewhere. Of course, if the private sector is perceived to be making excessive profits from PPPs this will undermine the PPP programme. This issue has to be anticipated by the public sector, which means that PPP contracts may need to cover issues such as the public sector sharing in refinancing gains or excess investment profits. These are also highly technical areas, where again it is all too easy for a small mistake to lose any benefit for the public-sector side. For example the concession agreement for a toll road on Californias State Route 125 limits the return on total investment to 18.5%. This is an obvious errorthere is no real chance that the total return would ever reach such a level. What should have been limited was the return on the equity investment, or the figure should have been much lower for the return on total investment. So this provision offers the State of California no real protection against excess private-sector profits, and is also of course another example of the type of failure in drawing up the financial provisions of the contract which I have already mentioned. Institutional Structure These and similar implementation failures can arise because public authorities are not adequately equipped to deal with these highly-technical issues. PPPs projects are typically scattered across a variety of different public-sector bodies within a country, with each public authority perhaps only doing one or two deals. Therefore it does not make economic sense for a particular public authority to maintain staff with PPP procurement skills, so once a deal has been done the project team will be disbanded and its experience will be lost. PPP procurement seldom forms part of the regular career path for a public official, and it is often difficult for expertise gained in a PPP by one public authority to be transferred to others. Of course external advisers, such as lawyers and accountants are usually recruited to provide additional expertise, but advisers are there to advise, and cannot properly run the process. Moreover I am afraid these advisers do not always understand issues such as the financial points mentioned above either. It is therefore necessary for the public sector as a whole to take steps to ensure that PPP skills are developed and maintained. Experience has therefore shown that a central PPP Unit such as the one you have in the Czech Republic should not just be an advisory body, but should largely control the whole PPP procurement and contracting process on behalf of the public authority. This may well mean cutting through the boundaries between central and regional or local government. Regional or local government authorities may feel that this diminishes their autonomy, but without strong centralisation and the career path which this centralisation provides for PPP experts in the public sector, implementation of a national PPP programme is very likely to be a failure. Conclusion So to sum up: The arguments for PPPs are not black or white, but private financing may be the only realistic way to develop essential public infrastructure. However the benefit of using PPPs can easily be eroded by inadequate implementation of this highly complex method of public procurement. I hope these comments will have some relevance for you in the Czech Republic, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. E R Yescombe Yescombe Consulting Ltd, London www.yescombe.com June 2007 Notes E.R. Yescombe: PPPsLessons of Experience PAGE  PAGE 5  Frdric Blanc-Brude, Hugh Goldsmith and Timo Vlil, Ex Ante Construction Costs in The European Road Sector: A Comparison of Public-Private Partnerships and Traditional Public Procurement (European Investment Bank Economic and Financial Report 2006/01, Luxembourg, 2006). Similar results can be seen in a separate study for U.K. roadsBent Flyvbjerg (with COWI A/S), Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning (Report for Department of Transport, London, 2004))*+,27M V r t $ 9 y } <dпԿԿԻԿԷԿԻԮԮԪԿԦԝh@LhhJ h9R6h9R h)6h)h)s hcl>*haYhOhh hPnhPn5 hPn5hPnhclhahk:CJaJhahPn5:CJaJhahcl5:CJaJ7*+ m n : ; # $ ;< & F1$gdPn & F1$gdPn 1$`gd)1$gdPnmn03,-|}|} BCA!B!T!U! $$1$gd & F1$gdPn1$gdPn+- 6?{}    :;DNUwx{}~%&cdWZÿ˿翻׻˷۳ۯ۫h&QUhg hHhAhT7"h6hw_Ahvh6)hA{hth)shh hX h<hh9RhPnhPnhPn>*C vzA'578"MOY\koacdҾ󮪮h|hGhtk0h\h6XAhA{hAh~h*`h-Xh hg h&Eh hh qh<h&QU hH6hH h6hC " . v w !$!>!?!@!B!C!D!F!S!T!U!_!c!k!!""""""b#f####$$:%y%%%%%%%%&&,&S&r&{&&&?'G'^'`'h$p h%}6jh$p0J"UhQ7 hgihYqhA{ hG6h|hC Wh[hPnhPn>* hPn>*h*hPnhthHhhtk0hGh&QUh%}=U!""s&*)z*++,,M-N-n-- .C.D.//0000 & F1$5$7$8$9DH$gd*1$gd* & F1$gdt & F1$gdPn1$gdPn $$1$gd`'h'''''''''w({(((((((((()()))*)3)T)~))))O*x*y******++++++,,D.H.R._.`...../վվhL(vh3%h@Lh.hPnh*>* h*>*h*h%U h%}h[hvh[h)htk0 hth0h0ht hthth$p h%}h%} h%}6hC WhA{h+h%}8/t//////////000&0;0K0{0|0000000000^11<2>2B2X2Y2Z233333 4L4X4b4o4y45556@6666\7h7j778 8 8888촼а̬ԬȬhRhOh}8IhYh3hh[hA{hhQ7 hb:h I hGhPnhPnhPn>* hPn>*hPnh.hUhC Wh*@0=2>2Y2Z23388E:F:]:^:D=E=^=_=A>B>??AAAAD1$gdHD1 $$1$gdPn1$gdY $$1$gd.1$gdPn88O889/909999999999999D:E:F:J:\:^:::;;<<$<*<3<a<g<h<}<<<<= =E=I=]=^=_=x====@>B>??o@}@@@@AaAkAoAAAAAA̿Կ쿻Է̻ h&$3>*h)hhDhHD1 hPn>*h@Shh<hhPnhPn>*hPnh}8Ih2V0h Ih_hOhHEA1B2BBBBB8C?CCCC DDD#D7DDDDDFFFF FOFFFFFFGHHHH*HCHEHRHSHTHXHcHdHeHkHHHHIICIOIWIÿûÿ÷ǦÚ÷ÐÌhjh0J"UhRghPnhPn>* hPn>*h)hW?hh{h`hLhL0YhPnhPnhPn5 hPn5h<h_ h&$3h&$3hzHh Ch h&$36h)th&$37DDFFFF FSHTHdHeHLLNNdOeOPPP QQQ RRTT & F1$gdPn $$1$gd2V01$gd1$gdPnWI\IeIiIIIIIJJJJJJJJJJKPKKdLLL'MMMMMMNLNNNNNNN-OFOGOKOcOdOiOmOnOyOOOP$PqPsPPPPPQ QSQrQQQQQQQQQQ RRhP4ho h06h0h1+h hhhA^ h6hhLh5hW@h{hL0YhHR~RRiTTTTTTTTUUUUOVQVVVVVVdWeWWWWW,X.XgXnXXXXXX~YYYYYYYYYYZZZZ[[[[[[[[O\R\\̼h,h@Sh A6h Ah `h"h*h<\thh1+h_Hhhhh)hVphW?hPnhPn>* hPn>*hPn h@Sh@Sh{hRSh`=TTTPVQVYYYYZZ[[i]j]^^2`3`bbddddd1$gd"1$gd+1$gdPn1$gdW? $$1$gdHD1\\\h]j]w]]]]]`^n^^^^^^3`=``(a:aaaab*b9bkbqbbccccd dd!d_d~ddddddddddeefff gh&h3iiɽɱhkh>3h)h"h"5h"h8pGhqh|)RhL@he-hRgh<\thRhW@h+ hF""hF""h,ho5hh AhVphF""h `h(;d{g|ghhkkkkkkk_lllqmrmsmmmmmmm1$gd6) $1$a$gdPn & F1$gdPn $$1$gd1$gdPn1$gd"iiij.j k*k9kfkgkkkkkkkkklGlHlllqmrmsmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmϰϬ}v}lhh3%h3%h3%6CJ hq6CJ h3%6CJ hqCJ h3%CJh[ h<h[ h<hL0YhPnhL0Y5CJh6)hhPnmHsHhL@h `hh+h1 hPnhPnhPn5 hPn5he-h"hx3h)h Gnh>3hkh&'mmmmmmmmmm n n nnnnuœÜ./0123gd$p# #&`#$gd-@%%$a$gd3%#gd<1$gdF""mmmmmmmmnnnn n n n nnnnnn(nInennno"ocoooooooѹ蛓}o\}o}ZU%hh!06]aJmHnHtH uhh!0aJmHnHu"hh!0]aJmHnHtH uh!0h$ph3%6 h3%6 h$ph3%jh3%0J"Uh[hqh C0J$CJmHnHuh8{h3%0J$CJjh8{h3%0J$CJUh3%0J$CJh3% h3%0J$jh3%0J$Uhmzm#which shows (Figure 3) that there is a 50% probability that U.K. road projects will have a cost overrun around 20%.  National Audit Office, Improving the PFI Tendering Process (London, 2007) For a fuller discussion of the issues in this paper, cf. E.R. Yescombe, Public-Private PartnershipsPrinciples of Policy and Finance (Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 2007), Chapter 2. See the Bibliography to this book for an extensive list of academic and other studies relating to PPPs; this is also available (and regularly updated) online at www.yescombe.com. (,<PUtuvœÜ Gy-./0234Ͱ} h<hL0Yhmzmhqh[ hhF"" hF""CJh<hF""6CJh<hF""CJhF""hg hhg 6 hg 6hh3%6h3%jh3%0J"U h!0h3%hd(o]aJmHnHtH uh!0]aJmHnHtH u341$gdF""1 0&P 1h:p8{BP. 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